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THE ORIGINS OF THE RHODESIAN RESPONSIBLE 
GOVERNMENT MOVEMENT
M. ELAINE LEE 
Johannesburg
IN 1923 SOUTHERN RHODESIA, a country with a population of 
33 000 Whites and approximately 1 000 000 Africans, gained Respon­
sible Government. This was a great achievement for the white settlers, 
and an event of considerable significance for the future of the whole 
country. It was achieved in the face of opposition from the Colonial 
Office, the existing government of the British South Africa Company, 
and the South African government; for it had generally been supposed 
from the earliest date of white settlement that the country’s future 
would be linked with that of South Africa. The hostility that developed 
in Southern Rhodesia towards such a course was due to the rise of 
Afrikaner nationalism, and was encouraged by the B.S.A. Company, 
which was reluctant to relinquish the reins of administration before it 
had achieved its economic aims; the Company therefore persuaded the 
Colonial Office to consent to the alternative of Responsible Govern­
ment, which had been first proposed by the settlers themselves, and 
had been incorporated in the terms of the Supplemental Charter of 
1915.1 Had the demand for this form of government been delayed, it 
is possible that it might have been subject to the later change in Colon­
ial Office thinking towards its colonies in terms of the Devonshire 
Declaration and Passfield Memorandum, in view of the small number of 
white settlers in the country; and such a development would in turn 
have made it more likely that the country would have joined the Union 
of South Africa.
It is therefore essential to analyse the reasons for the demand for 
a change of government earlier than the expected 1924, and to examine 
the political movements that culminated in the vote for Responsible 
Government in 1922. Typically, the sequence of events in Rhodesia has 
been seen as a purely natural political development of a British colony, 
from gaining the franchise to achieving self-rule; but this simplifies the 
issues involved, and ignores the vital factor of the demands of the 
settlers themselves. For their dissatisfaction with existing conditions 
and the rule of the B.S.A. Company was not merely the expression of 
‘British’ instincts, but rather the result of internal conflicts over econ­
omic conditions. Indeed without these conflicts, fear of Afrikaner
1 Great Britain, British South Africa Company. Supplemental Charter . . . 
13th March, 1915 [Cd 7970], (HC 1914-16, xlv, 571).
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nationalism might simply have resulted in a desire to maintain the 
status quo of Company rule.
The political role of the settlers has usually been overlooked or 
underestimated. The granting of the franchise to qualified persons in 
1898 was in fact the outcome of a series of demands, public meetings, 
and representations to Rhodes for the vote, which had been ignored 
before 1896. The circumstances after the risings of 1896-7, and espec­
ially the possible revocation of the Charter, caused Rhodes to propose 
settler representation in a Legislative Council to the Colonial Office, 
whose assent can be taken as recognition that such a body and the app­
ointment of a local Imperial officer, the Resident Commissioner, would 
provide a salutary check on the Company’s government. The increases 
in the number of elective seats in the Council in 1902,1907 and 1912 
were similarly responses to popular demand, concessions granted in 
order to  allay discontent, rather than gratuitously offered by the Com­
pany.2 3 A demand for the termination of the Company’s administration 
was defeated in the elections of 1914; but in the elections of 1920, 
the success of the candidates supporting Responsible Government led 
to the referendum of 1922, and an earlier end to Company rule than 
might otherwise have been expected in 1924 or even later.3
These political demands and achievements can only be understood 
by reference to the economic situation in the country. The type of 
government established in Southern Rhodesia inhibited a normal dev­
elopment of political parties, and so created a situation whereby 
pressure groups wielded considerable political power as a result of 
their direct representation in the Legislature (see Table I). This led to 
conflict between the groups, and the failure of the white farming 
community to achieve what it considered a satisfactory representation 
had far-reaching repercussions. The Charter given to the B.S.A. Com­
pany in 1889 vested in the Company the right of administering the 
territory it acquired in central Africa for an initial period of 25 years, 
after which such rights were renewable for ten year periods. There was 
no serious challenge to this right of administration until the end of the 
first period in 1914, when an attempt by the settlers to oppose its re­
newal failed. The 1915 Order in Council therefore renewed Charter 
administration for another ten years; but, in recognition of the demand
2 See L.H. Gann, A History o f  Southern Rhodesia (London, Chatto & Win- 
dus, 1965), ch.6. M.E. Lee, ‘Politics and Pressure Groups in S. Rhodesia, 1898- 
1923’ (Univ.jif London, unpubl. Ph.D. thesis, 1974), ch.2-4, 6.
3 The prospect of continued Chartered administration after 1924 was con­
sidered by the Company; see the British South Africa Company, ‘Memorandum by 
Mr. H. Wilson Fox containing Notes and Information concerning Land Policy . 
(Strictly private and confidential; printed for the personal use of the Directors, 
1912), 9-17.
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for self-rule by a substantial minority of voters,4 it allowed for an 
earlier termination of Company’s administration in favour of Respon­
sible Government should it be requested by an absolute majority in the 
Council. Company rule, however, was efficient, and there was no reason 
to suppose that it would not continue for the full ten-year period. That 
this did not occur resulted from the under-representation of farming 
interests in the Legislature; and the Rhodesian Responsible Govern­
ment Party which replaced the Chartered Company as the country’s 
government in October 1923 originated as a farmers’ party. Although 
the achievement of self-government has previously been studied in con­
siderable detail, the economic and political development culminating 
in the formation of this party has been neglected. The Company lost 
its position as a result of its failure to adequately protect and repre­
sent the interests of all sectors of the electorate.5
Table I
SECTOR REPRESENTATION IN THE
LEGISLATIVE COUNCIL 1899-1923
Year Mining Agriculture Commerce Political Labour
Company Smallworker Company Private
1899-1902 2 (1) 2
1902 2(1) 2
1903-5 3 1 1 1 1
1905-8 2 1 (i) 1 1 1 1
1908-11 i d ) 1(2) 3 (1) 2
1911-14 3(1) 1 2 (1) 1
1914-15 5(1) 2 1 2 1(1) 11915-20 6(1) 1 3 1(1) 1
1920-3 (2) (1) (6) (2) 13 3
TOTALS 24(7) 6(4) 3 12(6) 4(7) 24 3
jjt
Representatives who stood on a political platform rather than as members of the 
sector to which they belonged are indicated in brackets; so also are representatives 
with divided interests.
The settler community (13 000 in 1899 and 33 000 in 1923) 
was divided into five major categories (Table II), of which the com­
paratively small agricultural and mining groups were to develop into 
the major political factions. The white labour class, of insignificant
4 Of the 5 057 effective votes cast, 2 140 were in favour o f termination of 
Company rule, and 1 883 in favour o f Responsible Government (calculated from 
F.M.G. Willson, Source Book o f  Parliamentary Elections and Referenda in South­
ern Rhodesia 1898-1962 (Salisbury, Univ. Coll, o f  Rhodesia and Nyasaland, 1963), 
107-9).
5 As is shown by B.A. Kosmin, ‘Ethnic groups and the qualified franchise in 
Southern Rhodesia 1898-1922’, Rhodesian History (forthcoming), the electorate 
was almost entirely white; and the large African majority in the country did not 
expect, as a defeated people, to participate in their conquerors’ government, and 
were not expected by it to play a positive role in public affairs.
political account before the First World War, was to contribute sub­
stantially to the course of events in 1920 and 1922. The mining sector, 
the most influential in 1899, had declined in numerical and political 
significance by 1923, in contrast to the agricultural community, which 
by 1923 formed the largest single group in the electorate.
Table I I6
ANALYSIS OF THE 1899 VOTERS ROLL
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Occupation Number
Industrial (including railwaymen,
artisans and professional men) 1 638
Civil Service /Police 953
Commerce 952
Mining 675
Agriculture (including transport 389
riders, market gardeners, etc.)
TOTAL 4 607
Popular discontent before 1907 was led usually by members of 
the commercial community, who were most affected by the economic 
depressions during which political factions were formed to oppose 
Company rule and demand political and financial concessions. They 
were supported by members of the white farming population, which 
was, however, extremely small and disunited before 1904. The for­
mation of the Rhodesia Agricultural Union (R.A.U.) in 1904 lent 
strength to farming demands from this date, and from 1907, political 
agitation was increasingly led by representatives of farming organis­
ations. The settlers, however, were by no means united against the 
Company. The political demands made first by the commercial sector 
and later by farming representatives were invariably opposed by the 
capitalist mining sector. Although the Chambers of Mines opposed the 
commercially-led Abrogation of the Charter movements of 1902,1904 
and 1906 as well as the Responsible Government movement of 1914 
and 1920, conflict between mining and farming interests was the more 
intense and dominated events in the country once coherent expression 
of farming grievances was formulated in opposition to the privileged 
economic position of mining groups. The factions formed throughout 
the period were composed largely of members from one or other of 
these main sectors.
Since the expectation of both Company and settlers in the 1890s 
had been that Rhodesia’s future would be based on the mining indus­
try, this sector was favoured by legislation and other benefits at the 
expense of the rest of the community. Mining representatives in the
6 [The]Bullawayo\Chron[icle], 22 and 29 Apr. 1899.
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Legislature after 1898 ensured the continuation of their privileged 
status, and the weight of this representation reflected the awareness of 
the mining bodies of the need to protect their position from challenges 
and threats to their acquired rights; this was particularly so after 1903, 
when it was becoming apparent that the premise on which the policy 
of the Administration was based, was false: the gold resources of the 
country were proving inadequate as a foundation for a permanent 
policy of favouring mining capitalist companies in order to promote 
general development and settlement. Somewhat reluctantly, in view of 
the close links that existed between mining capitalists and the B.S.A. 
Company, the Administration began to encourage the growth of the 
farming industry from 1904.
Previous political agitation had been rooted in general economic 
conditions, the failure to find gold in Mashonaland in the 1890s, the 
post South African War depression of 1902, and the collapse of con­
fidence in the London market in 1902-3. It had been in the Company’s 
interest to restore market faith in the country by alleviating local dis­
content as far as possible. Amelioration of the royalty system satisfied 
the mining interests and small-workers; reductions in railway rates 
restored the goodwill of the commercial classes.7 The majority of the 
settlers had no other acute objections to Company rule, and such con­
cessions were followed by the collapse of factions formed to oppose it. 
It was less easy, almost impossible, however, to satisfy the demands 
made by farmers. The position established by the mining industry had 
been primarily at the expense of landowners. Although several differ­
ent forms of land title existed, all were subject to reservations and 
restrictions imposed by the mining laws. The Mines and Minerals Ordin­
ance (No. 1 of 1895) gave holders of prospecting licences the right to 
prospect and search for minerals on any government or private land 
subject to a mineral reservation. Prospectors had the right of free 
grazing for 20 draught animals, provided no horned cattle were taken 
upon occupied land without the consent of the occupier; the right to 
take for domestic use or for mining purposes indigenous timber, unless 
otherwise reserved by a Mining Commissioner, on payment to the own­
er of the land such price as fixed by regulation; and the right of taking 
free of charge water required for domestic use from any land open to 
prospecting.8 All ground was in fact open to prospecting unless notice 
was given by the government of reservation against pegging. The only 
areas restricted from pegging were land within 200 yards of any inhabit­
ed house, land under actual cultivation, or areas set aside for townships, 
building purposes, roads or dams.
7 Mines and Minerals Ordinance (No. 19 of 1903), sections 40-5; RC/2/4/5 
(Resident Commissioner: Out Letters: High Commissioner for South Africa, Affairs 
in Southern Rhodesia: 22 Sept. 1904 - 25 Nov. 1905), R esid en t] Com[missioner] 
to High Com., 10 Jan. 1905.
8 The terms and conditions of Prospecting Licences, Mining Claims and Land 
Title can be found in the Government Gazette and the Statute Law o f Southern 
Rhodesia, but they are conveniently summarised in H. Bertin, Land Titles in South­
ern Rhodesia (Salisbury, Argus [1912]).
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The holder of a registered block of claims had the right of grazing 
upon land open to prospecting for such draught animals, including 
homed cattle, as were necessary for the working of his location, upon 
payment to the occupier of Is. per head per month; and the same 
right to timber and water, subject to the same conditions, as possessed 
by the holder of a prospecting licence. If necessary, and requested by 
the occupier, he would have to fence off an area sufficient for the 
grazing of his stock, the occupier to pay half the costs.
Of the actual land titles, the Victoria Agreement Title, issued in 
Matabeleland to members of the 1893 columns, gave the proprietor of 
the surface half of any claim licences or rents that accrued to the Com­
pany from any registered mining location or site, the holder of which 
had the right to cut any timber for bona fide mining or domestic uses, 
on payment according to the tariff for timber on private ground. All 
other land titles contained a full reservation of minerals, mineral oils 
and precious stones to the Company. The title deed of Pioneer Grants 
entailed the loss, without compensation, of any portion of the land 
covered by a registered mining location or site, the holder of which had 
the exclusive right to cut any indigenous timber on land covered by his 
location or site. Permits of Occupation, in common use after 1900 for 
long-term purchase of land, contained clauses debarring tenants from 
granting store sites and from carrying on trade without permission of 
the Company. Sale or removal of indigenous wood was also prohibited, 
although tenants were entitled to cut such wood as they required for 
building, fencing and domestic purposes.
The most controversial title, however, was that applied to land on 
the Gold Belt, and this was to be the main source of conflict between 
the mining and farming communities. In the 1890s the generally 
accepted view was that mining and farming could not thrive side by 
side, and there had been a universal prohibition against the selection of 
land on the Gold Belt (once such areas were known — they were never 
fully defined), although it was possible to lease such land. By the early 
1900s much of the best land away from the Gold Belt had been alien­
ated, and there was therefore a demand for farms on the Gold Belt, 
which contained rich soils suitable for agriculture. Moreover, as farming 
was not generally on a commercial basis before 1906, nearby mines 
provided a supplementary means of income in the form of sales of 
timber, transport riding or trading. In 1905 the B.S.A. Company Board 
approved the granting of title to land on the Gold Belt, with substan­
tial reservations in favour of the miner, including the complete reser­
vation of timber and water, in addition to the clauses of the Permit of 
Occupation debarring trade and the granting of store sites.
In addition to the disabilities inflicted by land titles and the 
mining laws, the vast acreages alienated to mining companies in return
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for their investments in the country9 were often sited conveniently 
close to the main centres, and were held as a long-term investment, 
thus restricting the availability of fanning land and access to markets. 
As well as these disadvantages resulting from the Company’s mining 
policy, farming suffered from the successful response of the African 
peasantry to demands for produce after 1890.10 Despite increasing 
numbers of active white farmers after the turn of the century,11 Afri­
can and Asian producers continued to dominate the local market for 
some years, and forced settlers to turn to crops more suitable for ex­
port, such as tobacco and cotton, for which, however, there were at 
first no marketing facilities. Shortages of labour resulted from the 
ability of the peasantry to meet the financial demands made of them 
by the Administration by means other than sale of labour; this increas­
ed the difficulties of white farmers, who blamed the Company for its 
inability to secure labour supplies.12 The doubly disadvantageous 
position of white farmers, thwarted by miners and Africans, was on 
both counts thought to be attributable to Company policy.
The promotion of land settlement by the Company from 1904 
resulted in increased numbers of white farmers, and assisted the dev­
elopment of farming associations and the formation of the R.A.U., but 
did not otherwise materially affect the situation. Failure to aid farming 
development was partly a result of the weak financial position of the 
Company; administrative officials were instructed to restrict expendi­
ture in every possible way in 1904.13 However, the Company attempt­
ed to overcome its financial problems and promote land settlement by 
the introduction of a Loan Ordinance (No. 14) in 1905,by which a loan 
of £250 000 could be raised from the public for the assistance of 
agriculture, at no expense to the Company’s shareholders. Although 
the objects of the ordinance were approved by the settlers, there was 
some objection to the fact that the country was expected to finance the
9 Willoughby’s Company, for example, was granted 600 000 acres in return 
for expenditure of £30 000 within three years, CT/1/11/2/3 (Cape Town (Kimber­
ley) Office: In Letters and Correspondence: London Office: Mashonaland: Land 
Settlement, 19 Oct. 1891 - 22 Nov. 1894), London Office to Cape Town Office, 
6 May 1892 covering copy Memorandum, 4 May 1892. By 1896 some nine million 
acreas had been alienated.
19 I.R. Phimister, ‘Peasant production and underdevelopment in Southern 
Rhodesia 1890-1914’, African Affairs (1974), 73, 217-28.
11 The number of farms being worked in 1903 was 317, ‘Digest of Agricultur­
al Returns’, The Rhodesian Agricultural Journal (1903-4), 1, 97; by 1905 it had 
risen to 948, Southern Rhodesia, Report on the Department o f  Agriculture for the 
Year Ended 31st March, 1905 (Sessional Papers, 1905), 1. The number o f Whites 
engaged in agriculture similarly went up from 879 in 1904 to 2 067 by 1911,
Southern Rhodesia, Report o f  the Director o f  Census . . .  1911 (Sessional Papers, 
A 7.1912), 20.
13 In 1901 the Administration, on Colonial Office instructions, orderedNative 
Commissioners to stop their assistance in labour recruiting, [The] Rh[odesia] 
Her[ald 1»26 Oct. and 9 Nov. 1901.
13 T/2/2/3 (Treasury: In Letters and Correspondence: Administrator, 4 Jan. 
1899 - 2 Dec. 1904), Admin istrator to Treasurer, 2 Apr. 1904.
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scheme; it was felt that the Company was evading its responsibilities 
under the Charter to provide for good government; and the Colonial 
Office reacted similarly and disallowed the Ordinance on the grounds 
that the Treasury could not allow the creation of a public debt with a 
charge on the revenue of Rhodesia whilst the Company remained res­
ponsible for finances.14 15
Limited practical assistance was therefore given to farmers. The 
Experimental Station, promised in 1903 and vital for agricultural pro­
gress, proved a disappointment; only 200 acres and the small sum of 
£500 was provided for its establishment. The appointment of an offi­
cer to assist prospective farmers with information regarding land 
available for sale was the only concession to land settlement, despite 
an advertising campaign in England to promote immigration. The bud­
get for the Agricultural Department was reduced in 1904, and again in 
1905 to a sum of £6 015, of which over half, £3 860, was adminis­
trative. In 1905 the small grant to the Rhodesia Agricultural Union 
was withdrawn, although it was reinstated later. In 1906 the young 
tobacco industry was aided by the construction of a warehouse, est­
ablished on a commercial basis, but the Administration then proposed 
the imposition of a tax on locally manufactured tobacco, which was 
dropped after strong opposition from the R.A.U.16
Thus, despite the increased numbers of farmers, the industry was 
not a prosperous one; in 1906 the country was still importing maize to 
the value of £20 221, and the Secretary for Agriculture pointed out 
that even the land companies who were engaged in farming were in 
every instance making a loss.16 The publication of the Rhodesian 
Agricultural Journal by the government from 1903 was of assistance 
in improving methods of cultivation, but in the main, government aid 
to agriculture was limited to loans for fencing and the purchase of 
stock,17 and the exemption of farmers from the Labour Fees Ordin­
ance (N o.ll of 1906) which imposed a labour tax of Is. per head per 
month on labourers supplied by the Rhodesian Native Labour Bureau. 
No real effort, however, was made to overcome the main farming 
grievances in regard to land titles and the mining laws, and only minor 
amendments were made after a conference between miners and far­
mers in 1904.
14 Southern Rhodesia, Debates [in the Legislative Council]__ 1905 (London .
R. Cary [1905]), 26-7 Apr., 3, 6-8; P[ublic]R[ecord]0[ffice], C[olonial]0[ffice] 
879/86 [Confidential Print, hereafter cited as African (South)], 763/267, C.O. to 
B.S.A. Co., 25 Sept. 1905; African (South), 802/15, C.O. to B.S.A. Co., 5 Feb. 
1906.
15 Debates 1904, 6 June, 32-3. R[hodesia] Agricultural] U[nion], Report o f  
Proceedings a t . . . Congress . . . 1905 ([Salisbury ] the Union [1905]), 56; R.A.U. 
The Farmers’ Handbook containing Report o f  Proceedings at. . . Congress. . .  1906 
([Salisbury]the Union [1906]), 68-9, 94 ,105.
16 Report on the Department o f  Agriculture for the Year Ended 31st March, 
1905, 23.
17 RC/3/7/12 (Resident Commissioner: Correspondence: High Commissioner 
for South Africa, Main Series: 1906), 212, Admin, to High Com., 18 Feb. 1907.
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Increased numerical strength, however, meant a louder voice for 
farming spokesmen from this date; the policy of the Agricultural Union 
reflected the prevailing dissatisfaction with the status quo in its con­
stant attempts to secure amendment of the mining law. Discontent was 
not limited to the farming community, and by the time the High 
Commissioner visited the territory in October 1906 there was a wide­
spread demand for an investigation into past and present administrat­
ion, for a separation of commercial from administrative revenue and 
for the elimination of the commercial interest from public affairs. A 
resolution demanding representative government under the Crown 
found popular support; and representatives from the various public 
bodies made demands for reforms, including a request for improved 
title to land and water from the farming associations.18 As a result, 
the Company decided to send out a commission of Directors to investi­
gate the situation.
The Directors did not visit Rhodesia until July 1907; as a result 
political discontent increased. Lord Selbome’s Memorandum on South 
African federation, in which he included a discussion on the future 
prospects of Rhodesia, revived the issue of federation. Demands were 
made for immediate representative government and eventual unifi­
cation with South Africa.19 This was opposed by Colonel Raleigh Grey, 
a leading figure in the Salisbury Chamber of Mines and a close asso­
ciate of the Directors, who warned the Company of the strength of 
the movement. Depression had given way to prosperity in Rhodesia, 
and he warned that the country was no longer dependent on the Com­
pany, which should institute more liberal and popular methods in 
place of the ‘silent and cast-iron form of government here’. If this was 
not done, ‘the result will inevitably be that the Chartered Company 
will be a failure administratively and politically, and you are quite 
sharp enough to know what it will be commercially if things are hurr­
ied in this way’.20 In May 1907 Grey formed a ‘Mashonaland Pro­
gressive Association’ to advocate ‘representative government under the 
Chartered Com pany,21 in opposition to the Crown Colony government 
proposed by the Constitutional League, which had been formed a week 
earlier. However, hostility to the Company increased when the visit of 
the Directors was preceded by the announcement that the primary 
purpose of the trip was not the redress of grievances, but the develop­
ment of their commercial interests.22 In fact the thirteen-week visit 
of the Directors resulted in substantial concessions. The elected mem­
bers were to be given a majority by the reduction of nominated
18 Rh. Her., 12 Oct. 1906.
!9  Bui. Chron., 20 Apr. 1907.
20 The British South Africa Company, 'Memorandum by Mr H. Wilson Fox 
on the Position, Policy and Prospects of the Company including an Investigation of 
the Company’s Title to Land in Rhodesia’ (Strictly private and confidential, print­
ed for the information of the Board; for the personal use of Directors, 1907), 14, 
Grey to H. Wilson Fox, 3 Mar. 1907.
21 Rh. Her., 13 May 1907.
22 Bui. Chron., 1 June 1907.
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members in the Council from seven to five.23 The validity of the 
farmers’ complaints was recognised by the Directors, who promised to 
simplify land titles. However, the Company found it difficult to give 
expression to this sympathy in practical form by reversing the earlier 
trends in legislation.
Although the Directors had promised a reform of the land titles, 
this was to be based on agreement between the mining and farming 
communities. A series of meetings was therefore held, and in February 
1908 a special meeting of the Agricultural Union was called to discuss 
the terms and alterations required by farmers. The resolutions passed 
at this meeting were used as a basis for discussion at a conference in 
March between all major mining and farming institutions. The repre­
sentatives of the Rhodesia Chamber of Mines (Bulawayo) proved most 
conciliatory, partly because Gold Belt titles were not issued in Mata- 
beleland where the Victoria Agreement title was more common, but 
also as it represented principally the large capitalist companies, who 
were less affected by the small financial sacrifices that were entailed by 
concessions. The Salisbury Chamber of Mines and the Smallworkers 
Associations, however, fought each proposal. The farmers’ suggestions 
were modified, and the conference recognised the landowners’ inherent 
right to timber,grazing and water. Permission was to be sought from 
owners of land for grazing, and a fee of Is. per head of homed stock 
per month was agreed. Land users were entitled to the water, and terms 
for the use of ‘surplus’ water by the miners were to be agreed, or sub­
mitted to a Water Board for decision by the government No agreement 
was reached on terms for timber.23 4
The bulk of these provisions were incorporated in an amendment 
of the Mines and Minerals Ordinance (No.19 of 1903), the Mining Law 
Amendment Ordinance (No.15 of 1908); but the mining representa­
tives, Grey and Coghlan in particular, took the opportunity of opposing 
the Ordinance on the grounds that the Administration had made alter­
ations to the agreed terms. These were in fact minor; the only addition 
of importance was that requiring miners to pay for expropriation of 
farms should no agreement be reached on water. Coghlan condemned 
the Ordinance. It made ‘for uncertainty, it interfered with vested rights 
... a measure which was not directly in the interests of the miner, nor 
the ultimate interests of the farmer’.25 Grey felt that consideration had 
been given entirely to the landowner. Although the Ordinance was 
passed, miners’ rights to grazing, water and wood on the Gold Belt
23 Wilson Fox was later to admit that this concession was not only in advance 
of what the majority of the settlers had asked for, but also, because of ‘faulty 
drafting’, went ‘beyond what the Company intended to give’, ‘Memorandum by Mr 
H. Wilson Fox on Constitutional, Political, Financial and Other Questions concern­
ing Rhodesia’ (Strictly private and confidential; printed for the information o f the 
Board, 1912), 89.
24 Bui. Chron., 13 Mar. 1908.
25 Debates, 1908,1 9  June, 39-53; 22 June, 54-9.
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were confirmed, and it was acknowledged that existing claims and 
licences were to continue in their rights. Most of the advantages won 
by the farmers were thus negated; farmers were not satisfied with the 
Ordinance and objected especially to the continued issue and terms of 
Gold Belt titles.26 Resentment was felt against the Company, which 
had failed to ensure full implementation of the decisions of the con­
ference, and this resentment increased with the labour problems exper­
ienced by farmers after 1909.
In fact the Company was obliged to tread warily between the two 
groups, introducing reform at the request of the farmers, later compro­
mising and reducing the concessions at the demand of the miners; for 
despite the failure to find a ‘second Rand’, Rhodesia continued to be 
dependent on gold revenue for its principal income and could not afford 
to discourage mining development and investment — a situation which 
mining groups warned would result from any interference with their 
‘title’. Any amelioration of farming grievances was therefore necessar­
ily slow, prolonging the issue past 1923. The farmers resented the re­
fusal of the mining industry to meet their demands, but in fact the 
majority of miners worked on a margin of profitability as low as that 
of most farmers; each concession represented possible financial loss. 
Hostility far greater than would otherwise have existed between the 
two groups was created, which in itself contributed to tiie failure of 
attempts to reconcile their interests. The extremism bred by this situ­
ation would not permit of compromise.
The Company’s efforts to  attract settlers and promote agriculture 
in order to realise its land assets meant that its attitude towards the 
agricultural community’s other demands after 1908 were usually sym­
pathetically m et A good example of this was the promulgation in 1910 
of the Private Locations Ordinance (No.14 of 1908). This measure was 
intended to prevent the large land companies’ practice of ‘Kaffir­
farming’, the extracting of rent from African tenants on their property, 
which returned a satisfactory revenue without any effort towards dev­
elopment but meant that land and labour coveted by neighbouring 
farmers was unavailable. However, the failure of the Company to 
satisfy farming demands in regard to title and mining rights resulted in 
the extension of hostility to the government The farmers considered it 
had not only prepared the ground for the conflict, but also fostered it 
by its continued alliance with the influential, London-based mining 
companies, in support of capitalist development and its own and other 
companies’ interests, at the apparent expense and neglect of the individ­
ual landowner and settler. A policy of concessions to companies, high 
railway rates, and slow land settlement were thought to be the natural 
attributes of a commercial administration, the first consideration of
26 The Mines Department, backed by miners, continued to issue Gold Belt 
titles, whereas the intention o f the government had been to allow the department to 
refuse applications altogether whore clashes with mining interests were likely, the 
remainder to have full title, S480/59B (Dep. o f Mines, Correspondence, 1912-50; 
Farmers versus Miners, Disputes, 1923-30), Downie to Premier, 7 Jan. 1929.
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which had to be their shareholders. Demands were made for the rever­
sal of such policies, for increased expenditure on public works, and for 
government assistance in the recruitment of labour and restriction of 
African competition. To be just to the Company, it attempted to imple­
ment aspects of this programme at various times, especially as demand 
for land would raise the price and improve returns from its investment 
not only in land but in the railways,27 28 but such policies were not 
necessarily effective,2 8 and failed to placate the farmers and other 
critics. Concessions were invariably ‘too little and too late’.
Failure in attempts to amend the mining legislation satisfactorily 
resulted in the reflection of discontent in a purely political form, for a 
change of government was considered necessary in order to effect the 
desired reforms. Before the war, political movements had been short­
lived, terminating with concessions from the Company, or a general 
improvement in economic conditions. The more enduring conflict that 
arose between miners and farmers after the emergence of a powerful 
farming organisation in 1904 resulted in a more deep-rooted political 
discontent which found expression first in the Rhodesian League of 
1912, and later in the Responsible Government Association.
It was to be expected that the mining interests would oppose 
movements antagonistic to continuation of Chartered rule, since a pre­
mature termination of the Company government, which, after the 
tumultous 1890s, had proved stable and conducive to investment, en­
dangered their own existence and profits. In particular a government 
controlled by politically inexperienced settlers favouring the farming 
industry was to be avoided for fear of financial mismanagement, exor­
bitant taxation of companies and termination of existing benefits such 
as the timber and grazing rights. Political movements prior to 1907 
were overcome largely by Company policy, but it had been aided by 
the mining interests, either by direct opposition from the Chamber of 
Mines, or by the infiltration of the movements by their members, who 
exercised a moderating restraint. The tactics of Colonel Grey were 
equally effective; the moderate parties he formed tended to attract 
support from, and thus undermine, the more radical groups. The oppo­
sition offered to subsequent farming movements, therefore, was not 
new, although the farmers represented a more direct challenge to 
mining interests as well as to Company rule.
By 1911, the rapid increase in the white farming community com­
bined with an acute labour shortage to result in the most serious polit­
ical crisis faced by the Company to  date, the refusal of farmers to pay a
27 The British South Africa Company, ‘Memorandum by Mr. H. Wilson Fox 
on Problems o f Development and Policy . . .* (Strictly private and confidential; 
printed for the information of the Board; for the personal use o f the Directors, 
1910), 36-7.
28 R. Hodder-Williams, The British South Africa Company in Marandellas: 
Some extra-institutional constraints’, Rhodesian History (1971), 2,39-64.
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labour tax. The increased interest in tobacco contributed to a deterior­
ating labour situation for a large labour force was required for this 
crop.29 The Labour Bureau established in 1906 was the most effective 
the country had known, but since farmers had objected to the monthly 
tax on labour employed through the Bureau, they had not participated 
in the scheme, despite the fact that the Bureau agreed in 1907 to pro­
vide farmers with ten per cent of their recruits. By June 1908 the 
Mashonaland farmers were complaining that the activities of the Bureau 
had diverted their voluntary supply of labour, and the R.A.U. decided 
to make its own recruiting arrangements in Nyasaland. The success of 
this endeavour united the white farmers: the Bulawayo Landowners 
and Farmers Association joined the Union in 1909, since labour was 
supplied for a wage of 10s. per 30 working days compared with the 
15s. wage required by the Bureau.30 However, the hostility of the 
Bureau to the independent recruiting activities of the R.A.U. resulted 
in the ultimate failure of the scheme, and the Union ‘was practically 
forced by the Administration into the Bureau’ in 1910, although they 
did manage to secure more favourable terms than those pertaining to 
mines.3!
Late in 1910, the Bureau’s financial difficulties resulted in a pro­
posal for the reformation of the Bureau as a Joint Stock Company with 
capital subscribed in England, but with continued assistance from the 
labour tax on employees. The financial crisis was partly a result of 
inherited liabilities, exacerbated by the decision of the Nyasaland ad­
ministration to end the Bureau’s recruiting operations there as a result 
of the high death rate prevailing on Rhodesian mines. An acute short­
age of labour resulted, and caused the discouragement of prospective 
settlers and considerable losses in the harvesting of crops.32 The farm­
ing community gave its reluctant support to an Ordinance constituting 
the reformed Native Labour Bureau in May 1911, but became indignant 
when a special session of the Legislative Council was called in December 
to introduce a new Labour Fees Ordinance by which payment of the 
Is. monthly tax was made compulsory on all employers, regardless of 
whether or not labour was obtained from the Bureau. Despite heated 
opposition from the R.A.U., the Ordinance was passed. The single 
farming representative in the Legislature had initially opposed it, but 
his conversion was secured by the Administration’s argument that this 
was essential to provide adequate financial support to an organisation 
which would ensure a sufficient labour supply.33 The majority of farm­
ers, however, particularly in areas which did not rely on a labour force
29 Exports o f tobacco increased from £2 892 in 1906 to £27 028 in 1910.
30 R.A.U., Farmers’ Handbook 1908-9 ([Salisbury ] the Union [1909]),‘Rep­
ort of Proceedings of Annual Conference 1909’, The President’s Address, 233.
31 R.A.U., Farmers’ Handbook: Report o f  Congress. . . 1911 ([Salisbury]the 
Union [1911 ] ), 4-6. Capitation fees to farmers were £1.10s. as against the normal 
£4.10s.
32 Southern Rhodesia, Annual Report o f  the Director o f  Agriculture for the 
Year Ended 31st December. . . 1911 (Sessional Papers, A 5 ,1912), 7.
33 Debates . . . 11th to 20th December, 1911, 13-14 Dec., 44-80, 82-93.
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supplied by the Bureau, strongly resented this measure which resulted, 
it was felt, from their lack of representation in the Council.
A Defence Committee organised farmers into a ‘passive resistance’ 
movement, and an increasing number refused to pay the tax. 34 This 
obliged the Administration to reconsider its policy of prosecuting de­
faulters and resulted in a request to the Colonial Secretary in May to 
disallow the Ordinance. However, considerable damage had already 
been done to the relations between farmers and government, not least 
by the Administrator’s threat to use force to exact payment.3 5 The 
R.A.U. made its first entrance into the political field during this period, 
with a demand for representative government under the Crown, and a 
new constitution based on the Transvaal or Lyttelton constitution of 
1905.34 *6 37*The Administrator recognised that in part the movement re­
sulted from inadequate representation of rural areas, and introduced 
proposals for redistribution and an increase in elective seats. The strife 
and rural unrest had brought home to the Company its reliance on the 
co-operation of the settlers not only for continued progress but for 
continuation of Chartered rule. Concessions were made to the farming 
community in an attempt to win its sympathy, and the farmers resum­
ed their privileged position of not paying the tax, while continuing to 
pay reduced capitation fees.3 7
The Passive Resistance movement was followed by the formation 
of the Rhodesian League, a party dedicated to ending Company rule 
with the termination of the first period of the Charter in 1914. The 
R.A.U.’s proposals had stimulated consideration of the possible polit­
ical changes in 1914, and the League was formed in Bulawayo in May 
1912 by men largely unconnected with the farming sector.3 8 However, 
within a short period, it was adopted as a more adequate outlet for 
political views by members of the R.A.U., and the majority of the sig­
natories of the League’s Manifesto of November were farmers.3 9 The
34 See correspondence in T/2/29/47 (Treasury: In Letters and Correspond­
ence- Subject Files: Labour Tax Ordinance 1911, 16 Sept. 1911 -1  July 1912); o f  
approximately 4 500 employers liable, 1 600 refused to pay in January 1912 and 
this figure increased to 1 800 by February. See generally, L Henderson, ‘White 
populism in Southern Rhodesia’, Comparative Studies in Society and History 
(1972), 14, 387-99.
33 Ibid.; P.R.O. C.O.417 (Original Correspondence, African South), 510/8363, 
Minute by Sir John Anderson, 19 Mar. 1912.
33 R.A.U., Report o f  Proceedings, Ninth Annual Congress . . .  1912 ([Salis­
bury] , the Union, [1912]), 101.
37 ‘Memorandum by Mr. H. Wilson Fox on Constitutional . . . and Other 
Questions . . .  ’, 246.
33 Bui, Chron., 10 May 1912.
33 See list o f signatures in Historical Manuscripts Collection, RH7/1/1 (Papers 
o f the Rhodesian League: Manifestos: 4 Nov. 1912).
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League was vigorously opposed by both the press and leading mining 
figures, whose accusations that it secretly supported absorption of 
Rhodesia by the Union of South Africa were given widespread publicity. 
The attempt of the Administration to win farming support by increas­
ing rural representation had not initially affected the popularity of the 
League, but the intentions of this electoral reform were in fact negated 
by the 1914 elections. Members of the League stood on a ‘Common 
Platform’ (also known as the Gwelo Platform) but were defeated, partly 
as a result of their failure to reflect the views of a wider section of the 
community,40 but largely because of the considerable pressure exerted 
by the Company and mining interests to ensure the return of candidates 
supporting the continuation of the Charter.41 Their League’s support 
was also undermined by a visit to Rhodesia by the Company’s directors 
in January 1914. At a conference held with mining and farming repre­
sentatives it was agreed that the areas of protected land around perman­
ent buildings should be increased, while fallow land was to be included 
in areas protected from prospecting.42 43The sympathetic response of the 
Directors to the settlers’ demands generally contributed to the success 
of those candidates who claimed that the country was not yet ready 
for self-rule.
Despite the fact that the farming sector now formed approximate­
ly 20 per cent of the white population (Table III), their numerical 
increase was not reflected in the new Council, in which over-represen­
tation of mining interests continued. Moreover, considerable dissension 
arose over the draft mining ordinance, for although in principle both 
miners and farmers agreed on moderation and the equal importance of 
their industries, in practice they were a little less considerate. The bitter 
attack on the Bill by mining representatives, and the minor amend­
ments made to its provisions, renewed discontent in the farming 
organisations, whose original demands had been modified considerably 
at the conference, only to be further whittled away in the Legislat­
ure.4 3
40 P.R.O., C.O.417/526/41619, High Commissioner to Secretary of State, 
13 Nov. 1913.
41 Lee, ‘Politics and Pressure Groups’, 136-9; Hist. Mss Colin, HE1/1/1 (Papers 
of Sir Herman Melville Heyman: Correspondence: General, 15 Jan. 1913 - 20 Oct. 
1915) ,passim for 1913-14.
42 Rh. Her., 29 Jan. 1914.
43 Debates 1914, 4 May, 70-100.
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Police and Volunteers 431
Religious Orders 107
Others 158
Without an effective voice in the Legislature (although the later 
reversion of the Marandellas seat gave the ‘Common Platform’ one 
spokesman45), the farmers remained isolated and unexposed to the 
moderating influence of the parliamentary atmosphere. Unable to bring 
financial pressure to bear on the government in the same way as the 
mining companies, their representative organisation, the R.A.U., could 
only advise the Administration of its resolutions, and had few means of 
ensuring that action would be taken. This bred increasing frustration; 
and unreasonable resolutions were passed which were not conducive to 
action being taken.
Reaction to this situation was again at two levels. After the post­
war depression the R.A.U. attempted to reform itself on a more polit­
ical basis with the specific object of achieving direct representation in 
the Legislature, but in fact this aspect of its reorganisation did not re­
ceive the required two-thirds support and was suspended. An earlier 
reaction, however, was not directly associated with the R.A.U.; this was 
the formation of the Responsible Government Association by leading 
figures of the R.A.U. immediately after its Congress in 1917, in res­
ponse to the Company’s attempt to enforce amalgamation of Southern 
with Northern Rhodesia Its leaders, as with the Rhodesian League, 
were mainly farmers, and it attracted widespread support from rural 
areas.46 In view of the predominantly farming support for the Associa­
tion, it can be seen as a continuation of the anti-Charter feeling 
amongst farmers which had led to the formation of the Constitutional 
League in 1908 and the Rhodesian League in 1912. It would perhaps 
have fared little better than its predecessors had it not been for the 
decision of the Privy Council in favour of the Crown in the Land case. 
The Company had always believed the land to be its principal asset,
44 African (South), 1015/108 end.
45 Col. W. Napier was originally returned with a majority of four votes; John 
McChlery lodged a petition against this result and was later declared to be elected, 
Willson, Parliamentary Elections and Referenda . . . 1898-1962, 108.
46 But Chron., 28 Sept. 1917.
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and had maintained this stance from the earliest questioning of its 
ownership, by virtue of the Lippert Concession and the conquest of the 
Ndebele in 1893. All income from land had been treated as commercial 
revenue, and since this position had not been challenged by the Colon­
ial Office, this was considered to be tacit acceptance by the Crown. 
While it had been to the Imperial Government’s advantage not to ques­
tion the rights of the Company before 1913,47 the land settlement 
scheme proposed by the Company in that year brought the question to 
the fore, for it entailed recognition of Company ownership. In view of 
the possible constitutional changes in 1914, it became necessary to re­
solve the issue of land ownership in the face of the persistent challenge 
of the Company’s claim by the settlers, in particular the Rhodesian 
League and the R.A.U., which petitioned the Crown for an investiga­
tion in 1913.48
The loss of ultimate ownership of the land resulted in the Com­
pany’s decision to avoid further financial commitment in Rhodesia. At 
the annual general meeting of the Company’s shareholders in August 
1918, Gell announced that, ‘it is obvious that since the land is not 
yours, capital for its further development must be sought elsewhere 
than from you’.49 This meant that a change of government before the 
due date of 1924 became a viable object for the first time, and thus 
attracted support to the Responsible Government Association. The 
elected members of the Legislature, elected on a pro-Charter basis in 
1914, commented that:
. . .  it follows that the country will be administered in 
future from its own resources, which, if the B.S.A. Com­
pany administration continues, of necessity involves that 
the people will have all the disadvantages of Responsible 
Government without the corresponding advantages. If the 
country is to be administered on its own resources and 
credit . . .  it might as well have the management of its own
affairs.50
Support for the Responsible Government Association increased 
further in 1919 after the election as its president of the most eminent 
settler politician, Sir Charles Coghlan, who had previously opposed the 
farmers’ parties. Lawyer to the Rhodesia Chamber of Mines, he had 
hitherto supported mining interests in the Legislature. A second factor 
relating to the success of the Association in the elections of 1920 was 
the support of the large white artisan class, who supported Respon­
sible Government in preference to the continuation of administration 478950
47 African (South), 932/38, Seer, of State to High Com., 25 Feb. 1909.
48 P.R.O., C.0.417/526/41556, Minute; the petition was described as ‘not 
very effective’.
49 The British South Africa Company, Report o f  the Twenty-Second Ordin­
ary General Meeting . . . 7th August, 1918 ([London, the Company, 1918] ), 3.
50 Rh. Her., 1918, Statement by Elected Members.
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by a capitalist organisation, or incorporation with the Union of South 
Africa, a country dominated by the ‘Randlords’ and favoured by Rhod­
esian employers. Labour combined with the rural bourgeoisie vote to 
result in the return of the Responsible Government Association mem­
bers to 12 of the 13 seats, with the 1 seat lost only as the outcome of a 
split vote.51 The Responsible Government Association can thus be con­
sidered to have been formed as a result of farming grievances, and its 
broader appeal as a result of the land case ensured its success in 1920; it 
is ironic that, having achieved this much, the R.G.A. lost much of its 
farming support after 1920.
The case for Union was fought more vigorously in 1922; not only 
did mining companies and employers generally prefer this course, but 
the B.S.A. Company stood to gain a more satisfactory financial settle­
ment with the South African government than with the parsimonious 
Imperial government. The support attracted to the Rhodesia Unionist 
Association was principally from representatives of the mining compan­
ies and other international capitalist groups, although it also secured 
the railway men’s vote by virtue of the better terms and prospects 
offered to them by the Union; also, surprisingly, it now had the support 
of the majority of farmers, not only Afrikaners but English-speaking as 
well, since the depression and insecurity following the slump in agri­
cultural produce prices from 1920 meant that the prospects for farmers 
under Union seemed to be more favourable than thought possible with 
Responsible Government;52 fanners had consistently opposed Charter­
ed government; once its termination was ensured, economic consider­
ations reversed their earlier support for Responsible Government. 
However, they had yet again chosen an unsuccessful course, for under 
Responsible Government they failed to secure the benefits that had 
once been expected of i t  This was due partly to the antipathy of 
Coghlan to the leading farming spokesmen,53 but it was also due to the 
fact that in order to ensure moderation and ‘good’ government, former 
Unionists, like Fletcher, wasted no time in changing their sympathies 
and political coats. The Responsible Government Association’s alliance 
with Labour was also abandoned in favour of the ex-Unionist mining 
interests.5 4 The structure of support for the Party was generally alter­
ed, but determination to make self-government succeed, and loyalty to
5* Willson, Parliamentary Elections and Referenda, 111-13.
52 Lee, 'Politics and Pressure Groups’, 230-4. It has usually been assumed that 
the railwaymen supported Responsible Government but an analysis o f voting in a 
‘railway suburb’ shows a large majority in favour of Union; this subject will be 
dealt with in my forthcoming article in Rhodesian History,
53 Hist. Mss Colin, NE1/1/1 (Papers o f Sir Francis James Newton: Correspon­
dence: Sir Charles Coghlan, 13 Nov. 1922 - 24 Aug. 1927), Coghlan to Newton, 
4 Nov. 1925.
54 Lee, ‘Politics and Pressure Groups’, 244-6.
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the party that had won it, ensured continued and in fact increased 
support for Coghlan after 1923 from many groups which were other­
wise disappointed in its results. The governmental system that succeed­
ed Chartered rule was therefore in many respects essentially similar to 
it, being based on co-operation with the mining industry, with slow and 
grudging concession to farming demands until the late 1920s. Econ­
omic pressures in the 1930s meant that the original requirements of 
the agricultural sector were finally met, with the abolition of the Gold 
Belt title, and restriction of African competition.
Although the achievement of Responsible Government has usually 
been attributed to the natural desire of the white settlers to replace 
the rule of a commercial organisation by a traditionally British form 
of self-government, it is apparent that the issues were more involved, 
and that economic factors lay behind the political evolution. Dissatis­
faction with their commercial form of government was not an inherent 
or a necessary aspect of the situation as long as it provided ‘good 
government’ and satisfied the needs of the settlers. Rather, it is believed 
that the inability of the Company to meet the needs and demands of a 
part of the electorate, which by 1922 represented the largest single 
occupational sector amongst the white settlers (Table III), resulted in 
the formation of a political party which felt it necessary to change the 
government in order to achieve its objects. Unlike the mining and 
commercial sectors, the farming group was unable to influence govern­
mental policy by the means available to them. Like the Labour move­
ment by which they were later supported, farmers lacked the personal 
contact and financial influence of the mining or even the commercial 
interests. Even more important, given the comparative willingness of 
the Company to meet just demands, the circumstances prevailing in 
Southern Rhodesia before 1923 resulted in a situation whereby the 
Company was not able, by virtue of its ties to and dependence on the 
mining industry, to satisfy the aims and objects of the farming sector.
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Females 6 457 
18 810
55 RC/3/1/125 (Resident Commissioner: Correspondence: General: 1922), 
No. 785, Res. Com. to High Com., 9 Oct. 1922.
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Without the long-standing opposition of the farmers to Company 
rule, it is unlikely that the post-war depression would have resulted in 
the well-organised campaign to establish Responsible Government. Al­
though the Responsible Government Movement lost its farmers label, 
without the earlier campaign challenging the land rights of the Com­
pany, no reason to terminate its administration would have created the 
same convincing appeal as did the judgement of the Privy Council. 
Despite the small size of the white population, and the large African 
population, the Imperial Government was obliged to concede Respon­
sible Government in place of the preferred course of either maintaining 
Company rule, or incorporation with South Africa, in view of the 
vociferous and prolonged campaign for settler self-government. A few 
years delay in such a campaign might not have yielded the same result.
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